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Abstract
Sound financial regulation does not require choosing between governmental
and private action. Instead, optimal regulatory solutions often blend the
expertise and adaptability of private-sector influence with the stabilizing effects
of federal oversight. This collaborative framework has a rich history in U.S.
derivatives regulation, which has long relied on self-regulatory organizations
(“SROs”) like exchanges, clearinghouses, and the National Futures Association
to help promote market stability and customer protection. SROs remain subject
to oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), which
guards against the proverbial fox-in-the-henhouse scenario while advancing
quintessential government functions like mitigating systemic risk.
The advantages of this self-regulatory framework were underscored in 2020,
when the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic spurred unprecedented volatility
across U.S. derivatives markets. Effectively navigating the market effects of the
pandemic required a calibrated approach that drew from the advantages of
SROs and the CFTC. The integrated response that emerged is a model for how
SROs and the CFTC can together promote stability through collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION1
Debates about the ideal form of regulation often pose a false
dichotomy, sorting regulatory efforts into two seemingly oppositional
categories: governmental or private. But this division offers an overly
simple account of the regulatory structures that define modern
administrative law. Instead, sound regulation is, more often than not, the
result of collaboration between traditional governmental functions and selfregulatory measures performed by private actors. Far from being at odds
with each other, government and the private sector often work together to
produce regulatory solutions that balance effective oversight with the
flexibility needed to adapt to changing circumstances.
This article will identify and discuss the virtues of both governmental
and self-regulation, identifying specific examples of each. As Chairman of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), my analysis will
focus on the U.S. derivatives markets, which offer an ideal vantage point
for examining self-regulation. The general framework for self-regulation
has evolved over time, but its core structure has been preserved. As
discussed in detail below, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) play a
critical role in regulating the derivatives market, subject to broad CFTC
oversight. This structure has for decades combined the key contributions of
both the private sector and government into an integrated regulatory system
that has proven adaptable to change. Just as an accurate study of
government in the United States cannot consider only the President,
Congress, and the Judiciary while omitting state and local governments, so
too must an inquiry into U.S. derivatives market focus on SROs.
One especially timely example of the self-regulatory framework in
practice followed the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which took hold
in the United States in 2020 and produced unprecedented market volatility
in March of that year.2 For participants in the U.S. derivatives markets,
successfully navigating the effects of COVID-19 required an integrated
approach that tapped the strengths of both governmental and self-regulatory
measures. In responding to an economic crisis of historic proportions, the
CFTC and derivatives SROs came together to foster stability through
collaboration.

1
This article is based on a presentation I gave at the Annual Brodsky Family JD-MBA
Lecture Series at Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law, Chicago, Illinois on
November 9, 2020. I would like to express my immense gratitude to Daniel J. Grimm, who
served as Senior Counsel to the Chairman, for his outstanding work on this article.
2
See Heath Tarbert, Volatility Ain’t What it Used to Be, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2020)
(describing historic volatility across nearly every asset class, including futures, equities, and
fixed-income securities) [hereinafter Tarbert, Volatility].
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I. A SELF-REGULATORY TRADITION
A. Derivatives Exchanges
Self-regulation has long been a hallmark of the U.S. derivatives
markets, predating the Grain Futures Act of 1922.3 The CFTC is a relative
newcomer in the long history of derivatives self-regulation, arriving long
after the Governor of Illinois signed legislation granting the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) self-regulatory authority over its members on February
18, 1859.4 This act by the Illinois Governor was the first effort by
government to formalize self-regulation in the derivatives markets, granting
the CBOT self-regulatory authority over futures trading in the core
agricultural commodities of wheat, corn, and oats.5 In the years that
followed, the CBOT expanded its self-regulatory approach to exchangetraded futures by implementing member rules for margin6 and delivery, and
by prohibiting “corners,” a manipulative technique that drives commodity
prices higher by obtaining large positions in both spot commodities and
their associated futures contracts.7 CBOT’s October 4, 1868 prohibition on
corners was another watershed event, reflecting the first-ever regulatory
effort to prevent market manipulation.8 These and other early exchange
rules were “self-policing or enforced by contract,”9 laying the framework
for the development of a self-regulatory system that would persist through
the present day—branching out from traditional agricultural futures
contracts to products involving swaps and digital assets.10
What is especially remarkable about self-regulation by derivatives
3

42 Stat. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. §§ 1-17 (1926). In describing the long history of selfregulation in the derivatives markets, former President and CEO Daniel J. Roth of the
National Futures Association said, “[t]he United States Congress first passed legislation
regulating futures markets in 1922. By that time, self-regulatory mechanisms for those
markets had already been in place for over 74 years.” Daniel J. Roth, former President and
CEO of NFA, “American Experience in Self-Regulation Over Futures Markets and
Jurisdictional Boundaries Between Futures and Securities in the U.S.,” speech at the
International Seminar on Legislation of Futures Laws (Zhengzhou, China, Nov. 12, 2014).
4
U.S. CFTC, “History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the
Creation of the CFTC,” https://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_
precftc.html. [hereinafter CFTC, History]. The CBOT was founded on April 3, 1848, and
engaged in informal self-regulatory measures since that time. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3.
5
Id.
6
CBOT’s first margin requirements took the form of “performance bonds” that were
posted by buyers and sellers. See CME Group, “Timeline of CME Achievements,”
https://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-achievements.html.
7
See CFTC, History, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, In Praise of Middlemen: The Regulation of
Market Intermediaries in Developing Economies, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 153, 159 (2005).
10
See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3 (while “the markets themselves, government regulation
and self-regulation have all changed dramatically over the years, but to this day privately
funded self-regulation remains the first line of defense” for the derivatives markets).
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exchanges11 like the CBOT is that it predates the establishment of the
CFTC by 115 years. During this period, the exchanges engaged in selfregulation because they recognized “that it was simply ‘good business’ to
discourage sharp practices which could undermine the vital public
confidence in the exchanges.”12 Based on this view, “as long as 100 years
before the first Federal legislation in the area, the exchanges . . . had some
sort of a self-regulatory system complete with codes of conduct,
surveillance procedures, and disciplinary powers.”13
It was not until October of 1974 that Congress passed and President
Ford signed into law the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act,
which established the CFTC as an independent federal regulatory agency
with oversight over that majority of the U.S. derivatives markets.14 Part of
the motivation to create the CFTC was the perceived need to provide
federal oversight over the self-regulation performed by the existing
derivatives exchanges. In deliberating over the formation of the CFTC, one
senator explained, “[t]o date, self-regulation has been left to the exchanges,
. . . It is difficult to act both as the law enforcer and the accused.”15
The prevailing view became that while the “day-to-day operations of
the exchanges should be left to the exchanges . . . a Federal agency should
have broad supervisory powers” over them in turn.16 An example legislators
11

It is important to note that derivatives exchanges and derivatives clearing
organizations function as SROs. See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Spoofing and Layering, 45 J. CORP.
L. 399, 459 (2020) (“Self-regulation in the futures markets primarily occurs under the
umbrella of CME Group, Inc., a publicly traded entity that operates four SROs and DCMs-CME, CBOT, NYMEX, and NYMEX’s subsidiary COMEX . . . .”); see also David B.
Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C.L. REV. 131, 151 (2012) (“Commodities exchanges like
NYMEX or the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) . . . are membership organizations that
engage in considerable self-regulation under the oversight of a federal regulator—in this
case the CFTC.”); CFTC, Request for additional comments on self-regulation and selfregulatory organizations (“SROs”), 70 FED. REG. 71090, 71090 n.1 (Nov. 25, 2005)
(defining SROs to “include designated contract markets . . . derivatives clearing
organizations . . . and registered futures exchanges.”).
12
119 Cong. Rec. H11352-11355, at H11352 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1973) (statement of
Rep. Poage).
13
Id.
14
However, the federal government did have a hand in derivatives regulation prior to
1974, most particularly through Commodity Exchange Authority, the predecessor to the
CFTC that was housed inside the U.S. Department of Agriculture. See CFTC, History, supra
note 4; see also 119 Cong. Rec. SI8963-18966 at SI8964, SI8965 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973)
(discussing the role of the Commodity Exchange Authority in regulating the futures
markets).
15
119 Cong. Rec. S23495-520, at 496 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (statement of Sen.
Hart); See also Jerry W. Markham, The role of self-regulation, 13A Commodities Reg. §
26:1 (Mar. 2020) (“Self-regulation seeks to permit the exchange members to regulate their
own conduct and play the primary role in regulation, while the government plays a residual,
oversight role.”).
16
119 Cong. Rec. S23495-520, at 496 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (statement of Sen.
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considered was the setting of margin for derivatives trading. In broad terms,
margin is “money or other high-quality collateral that buyers and sellers
exchange to protect against the risk of default.”17 Margin assumes two
forms: initial and variation.18 Initial margin “is like a security deposit” and
is required to trade.19 Variation margin addresses changes in market value
and must be posted if a trader’s position loses value.20 Together, initial and
variation margin reduce counterparty credit risk associated with trading
uncleared swaps.21
While the exchanges “are more intimately acquainted” with margin
“than a Federal agency,” that alone does not address the situation of an
exchange setting margin too low.22 “In such a situation, the Federal
Government should have [the] power to change the margin.”23 In balancing
these interests, many in Congress sought to preserve the self-regulatory
history of the derivatives market while creating appropriate federal
oversight, resulting in a system that “gives the initial decisionmaking power
to the exchange, with oversight power in the [CFTC].”24 The CFTC’s role
was to act as “an impartial umpire” to “regulate and handle the public
interests, the producers’ interests, and the consumers’ interests.”25
Senator Herman Talmadge put it more directly, explaining that “[t]he
creation of a strong regulatory commission is not meant to deprive
exchanges of self-regulation, but rather to assure they assume responsible
and adequate self-regulation.”26 In forming the CFTC, it was thus critical
that the new agency be given “the tools to require that the exchanges
perform their regulatory functions better.”27 This sentiment informed the
self-regulatory system that grew in the years following the CFTC’s creation
in 1974.
A Senate hearing in 1982 provides historical context regarding the
dual growth of self-regulatory exchanges and the oversight role of the thenrecently created CFTC:
Hart).
17

Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
119 CONG. REC. S23495-520, at 496 (Dec. 20, 1973) (Senator Philip A. Hart).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
H.R. 13113 CONG. REC. H2923, 2928 (Apr. 11, 1974) (Rep. John M. Zwach).
26
120 CONG. REC. S16127-16137, at S16131 (Sept. 9, 1974). Senator Dole added, “[f]or
viable, active markets, the exchanges largely regulate themselves, as they should. The
Commodity Exchange Authority has served to watch over the operations of these selfregulated exchanges.” The reason to form the CFTC was that the growth in the futures
markets required more robust oversight of the exchanges’ self-regulatory efforts. Id.
27
Id.
18
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Since 1922 government . . . has exercised regulatory authority [over
the derivatives markets], primarily by providing oversight of exchange selfregulation. When, in 1974, Congress provided the Commission with
additional and more powerful regulatory tools than its predecessor agency
had possessed . . . self-regulation was maintained as the first line of
defense. The terms of the [Commodity Exchange] Act and the limited
resources allotted [to] the Commission made clear that initial responsibility
for the operation of the futures markets is left to the private sector and the
self-regulators. The Commission plays an important oversight role in that
[it] directly intercede[s] when in the Commission’s judgment it is warranted
to do so.28
Four years later, a congressional assessment similarly concluded that
the self-regulatory arrangement was functioning as designed: the CFTC
“monitors the exchanges’ activities on a continuous basis” through both onsite personnel and rule enforcement reviews “to determine the effectiveness
of exchange self-regulation.”29 The report concluded that this system “has
proven over the decades to provide effective, but not overly burdensome,
regulation of these fast-paced markets.”30
While the derivatives markets of today innovate at a pace much faster
than during the early days of CFTC regulation, the unique balance between
self-regulation by derivatives exchanges and CFTC oversight has endured.
This balanced arrangement is distinct from systems of private ordering,
which posit that private industry should perform nearly all regulatory tasks
independently.31 But striking the appropriate balance is not always a simple
task, and it requires today—as it did in the 1970s—a nuanced
understanding of the roles played by both industry and government.
Yet all of this begs the question: what about derivatives-related
conduct that is not clearly tied to an exchange? During the 1970s, growth in
the derivatives industry placed new market participants who were not
members of any exchange into closer contact with the public.32 As nonmembers of any exchange, these entities—such as futures commission
merchants, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors—
“created a widening gap in the regulatory structure.”33
The solution to these system gaps arrived in the form of the National
28
Hearings on S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General
Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 42 (1982), quoted by Jeffrey W. Markham, CFTC deference to self-regulation, 13A
COMMODITIES REG. § 26:4 (Mar. 2020).
29
H.R. REP. 99-624, 7-8, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6005, 6008.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., Mark, supra note 11, at 458 (“Self-regulation differs from pure private
ordering in part [because it] entails government agencies such as the CFTC . . . imposing
formalities for the adoption or amendment of rules, policies, and procedures.”).
32
See Roth, supra note 3.
33
Id.
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Futures Association (NFA), a registered futures association with selfregulatory authority over its members.34 Before describing the particular
role of the NFA in modern derivatives markets, a brief contextual
discussion of the relevant statutory provision is necessary.
B. Section 21 of the Commodity Exchange Act
The CFTC is authorized to designate registered futures associations
pursuant to Section 21 of title III of the Commodity Exchange Act (Act),
which sets forth standards for registration, such as that the association be
“in the public interest” and provide formalized rules for association
membership and member conduct.35 Section 21 is the genesis of the NFA—
the only registered futures association—and plays a central role in the rich
self-regulatory history of the U.S. derivatives markets. In particular, Section
21 provides a statutory basis for implementing the modern self-regulatory
system of direct member regulation by associations that are themselves
subject to oversight by the CFTC.
This arrangement was designed intentionally and is reflected in the
legislative history of Section 21. For instance, in describing the need to
establish a protocol for registering futures associations under CFTC
oversight, one senator explained that the NFA and other associations were
important “for the purpose of self-regulating the practices of their
members.”36 As a House of Representatives conference report noted,
“[s]uch authority could only be exercised if approved by the Commission,
and only if the association has met the requirements of title III.”37
CFTC oversight over the NFA has manifested itself in numerous ways
under Section 21 of the Act. For example, no futures association can
become registered with the CFTC “unless the Commission finds, under
standards established by the Commission,” that the association satisfies
CFTC-defined registration requirements. Once a futures association is
registered with the CFTC, the agency is empowered by the Act “to abrogate
any rule of the registered futures association” if the agency deems that
doing so is, among other things, necessary to “effectuate the purposes” of
Section 21.38
The CFTC may also make written requests to an association to “adopt
any specified alteration or supplement to its rules” concerning the broad
34
The legislative history of the Act draws the distinction as follows: “exchanges are
charged with important self-regulatory responsibilities over the members’ trading activities.
Similarly, the National Futures Association . . . performs many important regulatory duties
relating to off-exchange functions and activities.” H.R. REP. 99-624, 7-8, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6005, 6008.
35
7 U.S.C. § 21 (2018).
36
120 CONG. REC. S18864-18872, at S18869 (Oct. 10, 1974).
37
120 CONG. REC. H10247-10266, at H10248 (Oct. 9, 1974).
38
7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(1).
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topics covered by Section 21.39 These and other examples demonstrate that
in the delegation of regulatory authority by Congress to the CFTC and then
from the CFTC to self-regulatory organizations, CFTC oversight provides
built-in accountability measures to ensure that registered futures
associations are fulfilling their duties to the markets and their members.
As this section has described, self-regulation in the U.S. derivatives
markets is a fundamental component of the regulatory structure. Since its
formation, the CFTC has effectively partnered with both the exchanges and
the NFA to promote sound regulation in the derivatives markets. While
these and other SROs maintain primary responsibility for regulating the
conduct of their members, the CFTC retains oversight of the SROs
themselves, producing a system that balances self-regulation with federal
efforts.
C. The National Futures Association
On September 22, 1981, the CFTC formally designated the Nationals
Futures Association as a registered futures association under Section 21 of
the Act, formalizing the NFA’s self-regulatory functions and placing them
under CFTC oversight.40 This model of a registered association serving as a
primary regulator under federal oversight was modeled on a similar
construct from the securities industry.41
After only a few years, Congress took notice not only of the NFA’s
progress in providing self-regulatory support for the CFTC, but it is doing
so in a fiscally responsible manner. An early House of Representatives
Report lauds the NFA not only for its progress in building the selfregulatory systems still in operation today, but also for financing its efforts
through member dues, “to some extent lessening the pressure to increase
appropriations for the Commission.”42
The CFTC’s designation of NFA as a registered futures association
allowed NFA to begin its work43 as a central component of self-regulation
for the users of derivatives markets. Through authority delegated by the
CFTC, the NFA manages the registration of diverse market participants
including commodity pool operators, futures commission merchants, and
commodity trading advisors. Moreover, after passage of the Dodd-Frank
39

7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2).
NFA, About NFA, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/index.html [hereinafter About
the NFA]. The CEA establishes numerous registration and governance requirements for
registered futures associations. See 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2019).
41
H.R. 13113 CONG. REC., H 2923, 2924 (Apr. 11, 1974) (describing the Act as
“authoriz[ing] the establishment of an association of commodity dealers or persons
registered under the Act similar to [the National Association of Securities Dealers] in the
securities industry.” (Rep. Poage).
42
H.R. Rep. No. 99-624, at 6009 (1986).
43
NFA’s self-regulatory efforts began in 1982. Id.
40
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”)44
in 2010, the NFA’s oversight extended to swap dealers and major swap
participants.45 In handling registration and other matters “[o]n behalf of the
CFTC,”46 the NFA is a key partner in fulfilling the CFTC’s statutory
obligation to implement the Act. All told, the NFA today is responsible for
seven broad categories of self-regulation that complement the CFTC’s
oversight role.47 To take one example, the CFTC delegated the job of
managing the Act’s registration requirements to the NFA.48 Today, the
NFA manages more than 45,000 discrete registrations, as set forth in the
chart below:49
NFA Membership Category
Commodity Trading Advisors
Commodity Pool Operators
Futures Commission Merchants
Introducing Brokers
Retail Foreign Exchange Dealers
Swap Dealers
Exchanges
Associates

Registrations
1,362
1,251
61
1,051
4
109
6
44,526

The importance of SROs in the functioning of the U.S. derivatives
44

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
45
See NFA, NFA Members, https://www.nfa.futures.org/members/index.html
[hereinafter NFA, NFA Members]. Like the CFTC, the NFA’s responsibilities greatly
expanded following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., John Okray & Rachel V.
Rose, Interview with Jonathan Marcus, General Counsel of the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 63 FED. LAW. 72, 74 (Dec. 2016) (quoting Jonathan Marcus as saying,
“[s]ince the passage of Dodd-Frank, . . . the [CFTC] has delegated significant additional
responsibility to the NFA. For example, the NFA now helps resolve valuation disputes, and
the NFA receives data directly from [swap data repositories] to support its market
supervision and compliance functions.”).
46
NFA, NFA Members, supra note 45.
47
In broad terms, the NFA is responsible for (1) managing CFTC registration; (2)
developing rules for NFA members that are subject to CFTC approval; (3) enforcement of
NFA rules; (4) regulating swap dealers through registration and compliance examinations;
(5) swap execution facility (SEF) surveillance, which the NFA conducts pursuant to
contracts with various SEFs; (6) arbitration of customer disputes with NFA members; (7)
educational outreach to customers and NFA members. Roth, supra note 3.
48
See, e.g., id.
49
NFA, Membership and Directories, https://www.nfa.futures.org/registrationmembership/membership-and-directories.html. Note that the figures in the chart refer to
discrete registrations rather than entities. An entity could, for example, be registered as both
a commodity trading advisor and a commodity pool operator. There were 3,298 discrete
entities registered with the NFA during the same period.
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markets is made ever clearer when considering examinations of market
participants. While the CFTC has a critical role in directly overseeing and
conducting examinations of clearinghouses, SROs are responsible for the
majority of examinations of U.S. derivatives market participants, as
reflected below:
Market Participant Examinations (2015-2020)50
CFTC

NFA

CME

CTA

0

1,500

CPO

0

1,300

FCM

0

150

IB

0

1,100

RFED

0

20

SD

0

270

CCP
MISC.

21
0

0
0

46

TOTAL

21

4,340

305

259

Among its many self-regulatory responsibilities, the NFA establishes
binding rules for members and is engaged in creating industry best
practices.51 Violations of the NFA Rulebook are addressed by enforcement
actions that the NFA can bring against its members.52 Through these efforts
and more, the NFA has long served as “a reliable partner” to the CFTC,
advancing efforts to mitigate systemic risk and curtail fraud and abuse.53
50
All data expressed in this chart is on file with the author. For the NFA column,
entities that are registered in multiple capacities will be counted in every category in which
they are registered. For example, a CTA that is also registered as a CPO will be counted
once as a CTA and once as a CPO. Entities in the “Misc.” category fall within one or more
of the other categories but are expressed only as “Misc.” to protect the confidentiality of
certain information.
51
About the NFA, supra note 40.
52
See NFA, Enforcement and Registration Actions, https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/
EnforceRegActionsSimple.aspx.
53
See, e.g., Okray & Rose, supra note 45, at 74 (interview with former CFTC General
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The NFA’s work in these areas effectively complements, without
displacing, the CFTC’s efforts.
II. ADVANTAGES OF SELF-REGULATION
Self-regulation54 offers many advantages to regulated industries, the
government, and taxpayers. This section will discuss why self-regulation
can be superior to traditional government regulation in appropriate
circumstances.
A. Cost Savings to Taxpayers
A key reason to favor self-regulation is that it can often achieve
regulatory goals while reducing costs. SROs such as the NFA are typically
funded by the regulated industry, freeing up taxpayer resources for other
measures.55 As a report by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) explains, an SRO structure “can result in substantial
cost savings to the government, because those regulatory costs are largely
shifted to the regulated industry.”56 Even where government regulators
oversee and monitor SRO compliance with statutes and regulations, “the
costs to government are probably less than they would be if government
took on the bulk of regulatory responsibilities.”57 Hence, government cost
savings obtained through the SRO structure are effectively passed down to
taxpayers who would otherwise finance the costs of regulation.58

Counsel Jonathan Marcus).
54
While this article focuses on SROs, a brief point should be made about designated
self-regulatory organizations (DSROs). When an entity is subject to more than one SRO, the
SROs are permitted to determine among themselves which one will be the “designated”
regulator of the entity. A plan is then submitted to the CFTC, which can approve, modify, or
reject the plan. See CFTC, Futures Glossary, Designated Self-Regulatory Organization
(DSRO), https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/glossary_
d.html.
55
See NFA, Funding, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/funding.html.
56
IOSCO, SRO Consultive Committee, Model for Effective Regulation (May 2000) at
12, available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD110.pdf. See also
Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1718
(2016) (“Put frankly, today’s major oversight agencies could not themselves assume the
responsibilities of their SROs without extraordinary increases in their staffing and
budgets.”).
57
Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29
OTTAWA L. REV. 233, 270 (1997).
58
See, e.g., former CFTC Commissioner Walter Lukken, Reauthorization: Let the
Debate Begin, 24 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2004) (“there are significant potential
savings to the taxpayer in having the [derivatives] industry regulate itself.”); see also Natalie
Stoeckl, The Private Costs and Benefits of Environmental Self-Regulation: Which Firms
Have Most to Gain?, 13 BUS. STRATEGY ENV’T 135,136 (2004); see also Marianne K.
Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust
Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 475, 475 (1984).
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B. Consistent and Sustainable Financing
While fiscally appealing, the SRO self-financing model can also
produce discernable improvements in regulation. The first relates to the
implementation challenges of legislating large-scale regulatory efforts, and
of sustaining adequate levels of financing for them over time. Legislators
may justifiably be “reluctant to spend taxpayers’ money to finance
ambitious regulatory plans[.]”59 Accordingly, shifting costs to regulated
industries can sidestep “the political considerations that surround” financing
and budgets, “effectively ensuring that significant resources will be utilized
for supervising the [regulated] industry.”60 Predictability is also improved,
as “[i]ndustry funding . . . provides greater certainty regarding the timing
and availability of funding and thus greater ability to make capital
investments in longer-term initiatives.”61 In short, SRO financing can avoid
the problems of fiscal wrangling and budget cuts.
There is also an argument that SRO self-financing improves the
quality of regulation. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
CEO Robert Cook has argued that under the SRO self-financing model,
“[t]he industry bears the cost of its own supervision, which alleviates the
need for even larger governmental expenditures for this purpose. This
funding can lead to heightened supervision.”62 Using FINRA as an
example, Cook explained that “the SRO model has resulted in a regulatory
regime in which every broker-dealer member of [FINRA]” is subject to
recurrent compliance examinations and application approval.63 The key
point is that self-regulation can scale with industry—as a regulated market
expands, so too does SRO financing. This is not necessarily the case with
government funding, which may not increase as regulated markets grow.
On this issue, for example, the CFTC offers a case in point. While the
CFTC’s jurisdiction was first extended to swaps following the Dodd-Frank
Act,64 and more recently to certain conduct involving digital assets,65 the
agency’s funding has only modestly grown.66
59
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1239, 1250–51 (2007).
60
Id. at 1251.
61
Robert Cook, Why do we need self-regulator organizations? – Cook,
INVESTMENTNEWS (April 2, 2017), https://www.investmentnews.com/why-do-we-need-selfregulatory-organizations-cook-71012.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
65
The CFTC has enforcement jurisdiction over fraud and manipulation in connection
with digital assets. See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); see also CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 495-98 (D. Mass.
2018).
66
For example, the CFTC requested a budget of $168 million in 2010 and $216 million
in 2011, the first year following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the beginning of the
CFTC’s oversight over the multi-trillion-dollar U.S. swaps markets. COMMODITY FUTURES
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C. Knowledge and Expertise
Industry knowledge and expertise are additional reasons to favor
self-regulation. Many regulated industries are highly specialized and
demand significant levels of expertise to manage them effectively. While
the dedicated civil servants who staff our government agencies can and do
obtain this expertise, drawing from industry knowledge offers additional
insight that can improve regulatory outcomes both for SROs and the
government. As one scholar has argued, “[p]rivate organizations are by
their nature composed of individuals or groups with an interest in and
knowledge of the subject area around which they are organized. This makes
them useful repositories of expertise to which government regulators can
turn.”67 As organizations composed of industry members, SROs have their
finger on the pulse of industry and can often obtain accurate information
more quickly than their government counterparts can.
It is difficult to overstate the value of industry expertise to regulatory
systems. As some scholars have posited, “[p]erhaps the greatest single
benefit that self-regulation possesses over other forms of regulation is its
access to direct industry expertise.”68 This is particularly true when
regulated industries are fast-moving or digitizing—such as modern
derivatives markets.69 Drawing from industry experts can also have the
effect of reducing the costs of regulating, both by improving process
efficiency and avoiding unnecessary or duplicative measures.70
Among other things, SROs like the NFA publish rules and conduct
standards that bind members. Drawing from specialized knowledge helps
ensure that these efforts are effective and well-tailored. In addition, the
NFA frequently shares information with the CFTC regarding developments
in the market, issues of regulatory concern to its members, and violations of
CFTC rules. The NFA even proposes rulemakings to the CFTC—ensuring
that the technical knowledge of NFA members is considered by regulators
as the markets evolve.71
TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2011
(2010),
https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2011.pdf.
67
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 181 (1995).
68
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 55 (2013).
69
Id. (arguing that “[A] financial SRO can enjoy a greater degree of information and
experience regarding the way in which financial transactions are actually performed in
today’s incredibly sophisticated and specialized economy.”).
70
See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1967
(2017) (“[S]elf-regulation leverages the technical expertise and knowledge of the industry to
craft a high-quality, efficient, and effective system of rules and regulations for the industry.
Indeed, reliance on industry experts to design and implement the rules should result in
lowered costs and increased benefits for the regulated industry.”).
71
See NFA, Rule Submission to the CFTC, https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsRule
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The expertise and knowledge of SROs are often reflected in CFTC
rulemakings. A recent example is the final rule on speculative position
limits for derivatives, which the CFTC finalized in October 2020. Generally
speaking, position limits determine the size of speculative derivatives
positions a trader may hold in a particular commodity.72 The CFTC
establishes the “ceiling” of speculative position limits, while exchanges can
apply further levels as necessary to help prevent manipulative conduct such
as corners and squeezes.73 Position limits do not apply to bona fide hedging
transactions.74
In the final position limits rule, the CFTC called for enhanced
cooperation between the agency and exchanges, as the latter have
“obligations to carry out self-regulatory responsibilities, resources, deep
knowledge of their markets and trading practices, close interactions with
market participants, [and] existing programs for addressing [position limit]
exemption requests, and direct ability to leverage these resources to
generally act more quickly than the Commission[.]”75
Among other efforts, exchanges can capitalize on their deep
knowledge of the derivatives markets and closeness to market participants
to provide the CFTC with deliverable supply information for commodities
underlying futures contracts, recommend position limit levels to the CFTC,
and “help administer the program for recognizing bona fide hedges.”76
An example is the process for addressing requests for non-enumerated
bona fide hedging positions.77 Under the final position limits rule, market
participants can submit one application to an exchange to request a nonenumerated bona fide hedge, and receive approval of such request for the
purposes of both exchange-set limits and federal limits, provided the CFTC
does not intervene within a ten-business-day review period (or two business
days in the case of sudden or unforeseen bona fide hedging needs)
following the exchange approval.78 The new process leverages existing
exchange processes, expertise, and resources while affording the
Commission the opportunity to intervene as needed.
In sum, the CFTC’s final position limits rule follows a self-regulatory
framework that has been effective for decades: wide latitude for SRO
efforts, subject to ultimate CFTC oversight.
SubList.asp.
72
See Opening Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Final Rule on
Position Limits, Nat’l Futures Ass’n (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement101520b.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Position Limits for Derivatives, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,236, 3,238 (Jan. 14, 2021).
76
Id. at 3,239.
77
A non-enumerated bona fide hedge is one that is not expressly identified in CFTC
rules.
78
See Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 75, at 3,375-76.
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D. Speed and Flexibility
SROs are also advantageous because they can move quickly, which is
especially useful during periods of rapid change or crisis. There are many
good reasons why government rulemaking processes are generally slower
than self-regulatory efforts: the Administrative Procedure Act is designed to
ensure that federal agencies weigh costs and benefits, inform the public of
what they are doing, and seek industry feedback before finalizing rules.79
Nonetheless, there are situations that require flexible, quick responses,80
and SROs are often best-able to meet this need.81
For example, in describing its supervision rules, the NFA notes that it
“expects that Members’ supervisory programs will vary, and NFA’s policy
is to provide firms with the flexibility to develop and implement procedures
that are tailored to their operations.”82 While governments can also provide
flexible solutions—particularly when applying principles-based
regulation83—SROs often have more procedural freedom to do so. As an
IOSCO report concluded, “[a] product of the experience and expertise of
self-regulatory bodies is their ability to modify their rules in response to
changes taking place in the industry more readily than government
agencies.”84 “In many jurisdictions”—including the United States—“the
more rigid requirements typically imposed on the rulemaking process of
statutory regulators does not allow [them] to react as quickly to changes
taking place in the financial services industry.”85 This combination of
industry expertise and fast adaptability allows SROs to pivot quickly to new
focus areas and concerns. As will be seen, this ability to mobilize and adjust
can greatly assist in responding to fast-moving market crises.
E. More Trust by Market Participants
SROs can also provide a trust advantage because they are composed
79
See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1605 (2005) (explaining that the Administrative Procedures Act “was designed to
promote transparency and prevent arbitrary, capricious acts that amount to an abuse of
discretion.”).
80
Federal agencies have the option of using interim final rules, which provide final rules
before a formal public comment period. Interim final rules can produce faster rulemakings,
but they are rarely used and require certain legal conditions. See, e.g., Michael
Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 748 (1999).
81
See IOSCO, supra note 56, at 3 (“SROs by their very nature have greater flexibility to
adapt regulatory requirements to a rapidly changing business environment.”).
82
NFA, Supervision, https://www.nfa.futures.org/members/ib/regulatory-obligations/
supervision.html.
83
See Heath P. Tarbert, Rules for Principles and Principles for Rules: Tools for
Crafting Sound Financial Regulation, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Tarbert,
Principles].
84
IOSCO, supra note 56, at 6.
85
Id.
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of, and subject to direct insight from, regulated entities. Empirical research
has shown that building the trust of regulated entities into the regulatory
process can lead to better policy outcomes, as participants become vested in
a program’s success.86 By gaining the trust of their members and listening
to their concerns, SROs “should enhance the willingness of members to
adhere to a set of standards” provided by the SRO.87 In short, “selfregulation may result in better compliance with rules because it may be
more easily accepted by the regulated parties.”88
In fact, higher levels of trust or “buy in” from regulated entities have
translated into higher levels of regulatory compliance by SRO members in
certain circumstances. An Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) report determined that:
Compliance with self-regulatory mechanisms . . . can, in some cases,
be stronger [than with government regulation] due to the benefits of buy-in
by industry members who may have helped design them and who may thus
have a vested interest in their success (Priest, 1998). The degree of
commitment engendered by industry control may also be beneficial for
consumers, as it may in some cases encourage businesses to “raise the bar”
and reach higher standards (OFT, 2009).89
Industry “buy in” is possible through the SRO structure because SROcrafted rules “are perceived by the regulated entities, because of their own
participation, as more ‘reasonable’ from the outset compared with the more
inflexible counterparts issued by government regulators.”90 In applying a
criminal law analogy, one group of scholars explained of self-regulation:
“[a]s any prosecutor knows, it is far easier to negotiate with and to monitor

86
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
652 (2000) (discussing a study demonstrating “that merely enlisting private actors in selfregulation can enhance trust among them, which in turn contributes to the program’s chance
of success”).
87
CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS:
OUTDATED SYSTEM OR WORK IN PROGRESS? 5 (2007), https://www.cfainstitute.org//media/documents/article/position-paper/self-regulation-in-todays-securities-marketsoutdated-system-or-work-in-progress.ashx. See also SEC. EXCH. COMM’N., Rel. No. 3450700, File No. S7-40-04, CONCEPT RELEASE CONCERNING SELF-REGULATION, (Mar. 8,
2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm (explaining that in the SRO context,
“industry participants preferred the less invasive regulation by their peers to direct
government regulation and the government benefited by being able to leverage its resources
through its oversight of self-regulatory organizations”).
88
Speech of Karen K. Wuertz, Senior Vice President, Strategic Planning and
Communications, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, “Model for Effective Self-Regulation,” presented at
IOSCO Conference, Sydney, Australia, (May 19, 2000). https://www.iosco.org/library/
annual_conferences/pdf/ac25-25.pdf.
89
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. PUBL’G PARIS, DIGITAL ECONOMY PAPERS,
NO. 247, INDUSTRY SELF REGULATION: ROLE AND USE IN SUPPORTING CONSUMER INTERESTS
19 (Jan. 3, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js4k1fjqkwh-en.
90
Michael, supra note 67, at 183.
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the actions of parties who share a degree of trust.”91 In the SRO context,
this dynamic leads to improved compliance because the particular rules of
the SRO are “recognized as consistent with and not impairing or opposing
the [regulated] entity’s goals.”92 Suffice it to say, it is considerably more
difficult for a government agency, such as the CFTC, to promulgate
regulations that are perceived by market participants to be inherently
reasonable and free from political bias.
F. Swifter Enforcement
Building on the prior advantages of self-regulation, the SRO structure
can also efficiently and effectively resolve violations of SRO rules. While
the CFTC remains primarily responsible for addressing violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, SROs play an important
role in reducing misconduct in the markets. SROs such as exchanges and
the NFA and registered derivatives exchange engage in self-enforcement of
their rules, wielding a potentially devastating consequence: the possibility
of being ejected from the SRO and effectively barred from the markets.93
There are many reasons to prefer enforcement by SROs in appropriate
circumstances. First, self-enforcement by SROs limits government
enforcement expenditures, allowing regulatory goals like position-limits
compliance and non-manipulation to be achieved without costly litigation
by government regulators in federal courts. As described above,
transferring such costs to SROs provides a float-down effect that saves
taxpayers money without compromising regulatory goals such as
transparency, price discovery, and fair markets.
Second, SRO-based enforcement actions are effective for the same
reason as SRO rules are: they are supported by industry expertise and buyin.94 Having come together to construct the rules of the game through an
SRO, regulated members often have little tolerance for those who break the
rules. That prudent degree of tolerance is grounded in practicality—if SROs
fail to police conduct adequately, the predictable consequence will be
greater government intervention.
Third, SRO enforcement can operate collaboratively and in parallel
with government enforcement efforts. Many significant CFTC enforcement
actions, as well as criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice and
91

Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 68, at 56.
Michael, supra note 67, at 183-84.
93
See Roth, supra note 3 (“If violations [of NFA rules] are noted, the offending firm is
subject to a disciplinary process which can result in the firm being expelled from NFA.
Given the mandatory nature of NFA’s membership, firms that are expelled from NFA are
effectively barred from the futures industry.”).
94
See Wuertz, supra note 88 (asserting, in the context of derivatives market
development, that “[i]ndustry participants recognized that those who were most familiar with
the customs and practices of a particular trade were best suited to create rules related to that
trade, to enforce those rules and to resolve the disputes that arose from those rules.”).
92
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other law enforcement agencies, begin with SRO referrals.95 This dynamic
is not just good for overall enforcement, but it transfers some of the
detection burden from government regulators such as the CFTC to industry
participants who are adept at identifying misconduct.96
Last, SROs provide valuable assistance with enforcing CFTC
settlements and court-awarded judgments. An important function of the
NFA in particular is to assist the CFTC in collecting restitution and
disgorged funds. The NFA also works to ensure that recovered funds are
provided to victims of fraud and misconduct. In addition, the NFA often
acts as a monitor for registered entities subject to compliance and audit
undertakings as a condition for resolving CFTC enforcement matters.97
G. Responsible Innovation
The derivatives markets are fast-moving and rapidly digitalizing. New
products and trends such as digital assets, algorithmic trading of futures and
options, and reforms in the use of data to monitor the swaps markets are
just a few examples of the ever-growing influence of technology.98 While
the CFTC retains the ultimate authority over these issues, SROs play an
important role in fostering and responding to innovation in the markets.
SROs are able to respond to new market conditions with speed and
flexibility, which is important during periods of innovation. SROs in
95

See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL 8 (May 20, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/
EnforcementManual.pdf (explaining that when SROs “discover potentially illegal activities
that fall outside the scope of their regulatory authority or that also violates the CEA or
[CFTC] Regulations, they may refer such activities to the [CFTC Division of
Enforcement.]”); see also Roth, supra note 3 (“NFA regularly meets with the CFTC and
with law enforcement officials to refer violations noted by NFA for criminal prosecutions.”).
96
See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 95 at 8. (“NFA
administers its own disciplinary program for violations of its rules by its members, and may
refer information to the [CFTC Division of Enforcement] regarding potential violations of
the CEA and the [CFTC’s] Regulations.”).
97
Final Judgment and Order of Perm. Injunction, Disgorgement, Restitution, and Civ.
Money Penalties, CFTC v. Reisinger, Case No. 1:11-cv-08567 *5-6 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4,
2017) (“NFA routinely serves as a monitor in CFTC enforcement actions . . . . NFA
processes and administers post-judgment restitution payments . . . .”).
98
See Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Interpretive Guidance on
Actual Delivery for Digital Assets (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement032420a (describing the development of digital assets
and stating, “it is critically important that the United States continue to be a leader in
blockchain technology. Under my leadership, the CFTC will continue to do its part to
encourage innovation through sound regulation.”); see also Statement of Chairman Heath P.
Tarbert in Support of the Proposed Rule on Electronic Trading Risk Principles (June 25,
2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement062520b
(discussing changes in automated derivatives trading and state, “[t]he markets exist to serve
the needs of market participants, not the regulator. If a technological change improves the
functioning of the markets, we should embrace it.”) [hereinafter Tarbert, Statement in
Support of the Proposed rule on Electronic Trading Risk Principles].
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particular are adept at applying principles-based regulation to developing
scenarios.99 As I have written previously, principles-based regulation “can
facilitate the development of new business models, products, and internal
processes.”100 Moreover, “[p]rinciples-based regulation thus encourages
market innovation, which is central to economic growth and prosperity.”101
To take one recent example, the CFTC recently proposed a principlesbased approach to risk principles for electronic trading.102 In that proposal,
the CFTC recognized that risk principles for electronic trading is an area
“where regulated entities have greater understanding than the regulator
about the risks they face and greater knowledge about how to address those
risks.”103 The result is that the exchanges need flexibility in how to address
electronic trading risks. Already, exchanges provide tailored risk-control
systems to help traders mitigate their exposure to credit, market, and other
risks.104 Providing exchanges with the same operational freedom for
mitigating the risks of electronic trading is both sensible and likely to
produce optimal regulatory outcomes.
III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Although self-regulation has many advantages, it is most effective
when backed up by traditional governmental regulation. This section will
address the CFTC’s vital role in derivatives regulation, focusing on how the
agency buttresses the self-regulatory regiment. The section concludes with
additional roles played by the agency that only a government entity can
undertake. In short, the government can and should play a unique role in
financial regulation, particularly where the advantages lie in its favor. The
recipe for sound regulation therefore is the proper blending of selfregulation with government regulation.
A. Oversight
The most important function of federal agencies with respect to SROs
is that of oversight. Government oversight of SROs is the key
distinguishing factor between the SRO system and other forms of private
regulation.105 As an IOSCO report has explained, “Government oversight is
99
See, e.g., Tarbert, Principles, supra note 83, at 6, 14 (describing the role of SROs in
performing principles-based regulation).
100
Id. at 8.
101
Id.
102
See Tarbert, Statement in Support of the Proposed rule on Electronic Trading Risk
Principles, supra note 98.
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Cboe, Risk Management Tools, https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/trading/
risk_management/; see also CME, CME Global Credit Controls (GC2), https://
www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/webhelp/globex-credit-controls/Content/CMEGlobex-Credit-Controls-Management.html.
105
See Hammond, supra note 56, at 1711 (“The agency’s oversight role distinguishes
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an essential element in the self-regulatory structure.”106 This is the case for
a variety of reasons, most notably to ensure accountability and provide “a
system of checks and balances.”107 Just as pure governmental regulation
raises questions about resource adequacy, flexibility, and whether industry
voices are being heard, pure private ordering puts at risk accountability and
public faith in the regulatory framework.108 Oversight by public regulators
is designed in part to ensure the success of SROs by shoring up
accountability and preserving public trust in the SRO structure.109
The key challenge with respect to public trust is the possibility of
conflicts of interest.110 As members of industry, SROs raise the proverbial
fox-in-the-henhouse question: does the SRO really protect the interests of
the public, or is it beholden only to its industry stakeholders?111 Concern
about an inherent “conflict of interest that exists when an organization both
serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members” has been
long-standing.112 The imposition of government oversight to help ensure
that SROs perform their self-regulatory duties faithfully is an effective way
to address this concern.
Calibrating the appropriate level of oversight is not always easy. As an
IOSCO report explains, “[o]ne of the biggest challenges that government
faces . . . is to provide an appropriate level of government oversight of SRO
activities without encumbering or usurping an SRO’s ability to respond
quickly and flexibly to changing market conditions and business needs.”113
Fortunately, the Commodity Exchange Act provides a detailed statutory
scheme that assists the CFTC in striking the appropriate balance.

SROs from voluntary or purely private self-regulatory efforts.”).
106
IOSCO, supra note 56, at 8.
107
Id.
108
See Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New Era of
Financial Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private-Partnership Models of Financial
Regulators, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 389-90 (2018).
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., former SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, The Need for Robust SEC
Oversight over SROs (May 8, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013spch050813laahtm (“Because of the inherent conflict of interests involved in self-regulation,
robust SEC oversight over SROs is indispensable.”).
111
See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Benefits and Limitations of Industry Self-Regulation for
Online Behavioral Advertising, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
FOUNDATION (Dec. 2011) at 9, https://itif.org/files/2011-self-regulation-online-behavioraladvertising.pdf (“Some critics see self-regulation as putting the fox in charge of the hen
house . . . . Rather than operating in the public interest, critics may assume that SROs
operate purely to protect the interests of individual firms or the industry as a whole.”).
112
Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory SelfRegulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1117 (2005) (quoting SEC Concept
Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exch. Act Rel. No. 50,700, 84 SEC Docket 619, 620
(Nov. 18, 2004)).
113
IOSCO, supra note 56, at 3.
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1. Futures Associations
CFTC oversight of registered futures associations—in practice, only
the NFA114—begins at formation and extends through disciplinary
measures and rulemakings. The genesis of the CFTC’s oversight over
futures associations begins with Section 17 of the Act,115 the requirements
of which are further detailed in Part 170 of the CFTC’s regulations.116
Section 17(a) begins by requiring CFTC approval before any futures
association can be formed. Formation requires, among other things, the
submission to the CFTC of a registration statement that provides data
concerning the prospective association’s “organization, membership, and
rules of procedures.”117 The CFTC “shall not register an applicant” unless
the conditions of registration are satisfied.118
To become registered, a prospective association must be found by the
CFTC to be “in the public interest” and able to comply with CFTC rules.119
Notably, a futures association is required to “demonstrate that it will require
its members to adhere to regulatory requirements governing their business
practices at least as stringent as those imposed by the Commission.”120
From the outset, this requirement ensures that registered futures
associations do not apply a “light-touch” regulatory approach that would be
less effective than direct CFTC regulation.
Futures associations registered with the CFTC must promote fairness
and limit the risk of misconduct by restricting association access to
qualified persons who have not previously been suspended or expelled from
the NFA or a similar futures association.121 These requirements can be
modified at CFTC direction in furtherance of the public interest.122
CFTC oversight also extends to futures association rules. Among other
requirements, association rules must be designed “to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of
trade,” “to protect the public interest,” and “to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of free and open futures trading.”123 Requirements
for customer protection and ethical standards for dealing with customers

114
While the NFA is the only registered futures association, this section often addresses
“registered futures associations” generally. This has been done to accurately capture the text
and meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, even though in
practice the provisions relating to registered futures associations apply only to the NFA.
115
7 U.S.C. § 21 (2018).
116
17 C.F.R. § 170 (2020).
117
7 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1).
118
17 C.F.R. § 170.9; 7 U.S.C. § 21(f).
119
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(1).
120
17 C.F.R. § 170.1 (emphasis added).
121
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(2).
122
7 U.S.C. §§ 21(b)(3), (4).
123
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(7).
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have also been added through CFTC regulations.124 Further, the CFTC
retains oversight over new rulemakings by associations, and has the power
“by order to abrogate any rule of a registered futures association” if
“necessary or appropriate to assure fair dealing” by members, or “fair
representation” of members.125 The CFTC may also request registered
futures associations “to adopt any specified alteration or supplement to its
rules” with respect to the requirements set forth in the Commodity
Exchange Act.126
Importantly, in crafting their rules, futures associations must ensure
that members and persons associated with members “shall be appropriately
disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine, [or] censure” from the
association if they violate the association’s rules.127 This provision requires
that futures associations act in the public interest by providing
consequences for the breach of their own rules. Association disciplinary
proceedings are subject to CFTC review to ensure fairness.128 In appropriate
cases, the CFTC can even “set aside” disciplinary penalties, as well as
remand them back to the futures association as necessary.129 These
measures ensure that association disciplinary processes are “vigorous,”
“consistent with the fundamental elements of due process,” and “[are] fair
and [have] a reasonable basis in fact.”130
Two final oversight mechanisms are especially important. First, the
CFTC retains the power to suspend or withdraw the registration of any
registered futures association. These consequences can be triggered if the
CFTC determines that the association has violated the Commodity
Exchange Act or CFTC rules, “has failed to enforce compliance with its
own rules, or has engaged in any other activity tending to defeat the
purpose of [Section 17 of the Act].”131 Suspension or revocation of
registration is the ultimate sanction to ensure that registered futures
associations remain well-functioning and accountable.
Second, Congress retains an external, oversight function over
registered futures associations as well as the CFTC itself. The Commodity
Exchange Act requires that the CFTC, in its annual reports to Congress,
124

17 C.F.R. § 170.5 (2020) provides in part:
A futures association must establish and maintain a program for the protection of customers
and option customers, including the adoption of rules to protect customers and option
customers and customer funds and to promote fair dealing with the public. These rules shall
set forth the ethical standards for members of the association in their business dealings with
the public.
125
7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(1).
126
7 U.S.C. § 21(k)(2).
127
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(8).
128
7 U.S.C. §§ 21(h), (i)(1)(B).
129
7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(1)(B).
130
17 C.F.R. § 170.6 (2020).
131
7 U.S.C. § 21(l)(1).
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“include . . . information concerning any futures associations registered”
under Section 17 of that statute.132 The CFTC must also annually report to
Congress on “the effectiveness of such associations in regulating the
practices of the members.”133 This second requirement in particular creates
incentives both for futures associations to act appropriately, as well as for
the CFTC to monitor their activities closely. A congressional backstop also
creates an external accountability measure separate from the association or
the CFTC, thereby limiting the risk of conflicts of interest.
2. Exchanges
The CFTC also retains oversight over derivatives exchanges, which
are registered as “designated contract markets” under Section 5 of the
Commodity Exchange Act and Part 38 of the CFTC’s regulations.134 More
recently, the CFTC was given authority to register swap execution facilities
(SEFs), which are somewhat analogous to exchanges that allow the trading
of swaps. There is a similar but distinct regulatory oversight role of SEFs,
but they do not typically function as self-regulatory organizations.
As with futures associations, the CFTC retains the authority to approve
or reject the registration of an exchange, which is subject to certain
requirements.135 Among other things, a registered exchange is required to
comply with twenty-three “core principles,”136 as well as “any requirement
that the Commission may impose by rule or regulation” under Section
12a(5) of the Act, which provides the CFTC with broad discretion to
establish “such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the
Commission, are reasonably necessary to effectuate” registration.137
There are certain distinctions between the CFTC’s oversight of
exchanges and its oversight of registered futures associations. First, while
the CFTC primarily regulates registered futures associations as
organizations with particular obligations both to their members and the
public, the CFTC’s focus with respect to exchanges centers on the
functioning of the derivatives markets themselves. In particular, CFTC
oversight over exchanges is intended to provide for orderly markets by
retaining oversight over market structure and trading activities. For
example, the Commodity Exchange Act places on exchanges the
responsibility “to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of
the delivery or cash-settlement process through market surveillance,
132

7 U.S.C. § 21(n).
Id.
134
7 U.S.C. § 7 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 38 (2020).
135
7 U.S.C. § 7 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 38.3(a) (2020) (providing CFTC process and
requirements for exchange registration).
136
The twenty-three core principles can be viewed at Designated Contract Markets
(DCMs), COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
137
7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A); 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5).
133

199

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:175 (2021)

compliance, and enforcement practices.”138 This is in addition to a
requirement that exchanges only list for trading those contracts that “are not
readily susceptible to manipulation.”139 Another goal is price discovery. In
this regard, exchanges are legally required to “provide a competitive, open,
and efficient market and mechanism for executing transactions that protects
the price discovery process.”140 In sum, CFTC oversight over exchanges is
designed to ensure that they are properly monitoring trading activities.
The second notable feature of CFTC oversight of exchanges relates to
how oversight occurs, which is primarily through core principles that apply
to every exchange.141 Core principles are at the heart of self-regulation
because they provide basic requirements while leaving exchanges with
“reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which the [exchange]
complies.”142 Rather than applying prescriptive rules, the use of core
principles to regulate exchanges is “designed to provide exchanges with
more flexibility in their approaches to compliance through selfregulation.”143 The CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight helps ensure that
exchanges comply with the core principles by conducting regular rule
enforcement reviews and examinations, which evaluate “the self-regulatory
programs operated by the exchange[s] in order to enforce [CFTC] rules,
prevent market manipulation and customer and market abuses, and ensure
the recording and safe storage of trade information,” among other items.144
The CFTC’s oversight over clearinghouses, also known as “derivatives
clearing organizations,” is similar. Every exchange must have a relationship
with a clearinghouse. Clearinghouses provide a critical function for the
derivatives markets by standing between counterparties to clear and process
trades that have been executed on exchanges. In this role, the clearinghouse
mitigates counterparty credit risk.145 Some clearinghouses have been
138

7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 38.250 (2020) (Core Principle 4).
7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 38.200 (2020) (Core Principle 3).
140
7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(9)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 38.500 (2020) (Core Principle 9).
141
An exchange must comply with the core principles in order “[t]o be designated, and
maintain a designation, as a contract market.” 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A). See also 17 C.F.R. §
38.100(a) (2020).
142
7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 38.100(b) (2020).
143
Former CFTC Commissioner Thomas J. Erickson, Regulatory Uncertainty Under the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 21 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 6
(2001).
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Designated Contract Markets (DCMs), COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2021).
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See, e.g., Heath P. Tarbert, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of
Final Rule on Alternative Compliance for Non-U.S. Clearinghouses, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
tarbertstatement091720; see also Derivatives Clearing Organizations, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N,
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ClearingOrganizations/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
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designated systemically important for their critical role in the financial
system.146 Clearinghouses operate as SROs but, like exchanges, are subject
to broad CFTC oversight to ensure compliance with their own set of Core
Principles.147 Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act further makes the CFTC
responsible for conducting examinations of clearinghouses to ensure that
they satisfy safety and soundness, financial resources, cyber resilience, and
other important requirements.148 The CFTC also conducts “stress tests” of
clearinghouses to help ensure they can withstand financial shocks.149
B. Additional Agency Roles
While oversight of SROs is the most central role of government in
self-regulatory systems, there are additional situations where federal action
is preferable. Without identifying every such case, this section will focus on
several that are both timely and relevant to the CFTC’s role as the primary
regulator of U.S. derivatives markets.
1. Administrative Law Functions
Only a federal agency can modify, rescind, or grant exemptive or noaction relief from a federal regulation. While SROs self-regulate their
members by passing rules, conducting exams, and bringing enforcement
actions, they must nonetheless operate within the formal regulatory
structure created by federal agencies in fulfilling their delegated mandates
from Congress. SROs have flexibility to operate within this structure, but
they are unable to change the structure itself.
Second, only the CFTC as a federal agency can act as the final
interpretive authority of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Core
Principles thereunder, subject to judicial review. While SROs retain
flexibility to implement Core Principles and related requirements, the
CFTC must remain the final arbiter of whether a particular effort meets
applicable regulatory requirements. This role allows the CFTC to ensure
that SROs are not interpreting or applying Core Principles in ways that are
contradictory or unreasonable. CFTC oversight also helps prevent bad faith
146

A “systemically important derivatives clearing organization” is defined in Regulation
39.2 to mean a DCO registered under section 5b of the CEA that is designated by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council to be systemically important and for which the
Commission acts as the Supervisory Authority pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 5462(8). 17 C.F.R. §
39.2 (2020).
147
CEA Section 5b, 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2018). See Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
supra note 145 (identifying Core Principles for DCOs).
148
See CEA Section 5b, 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2018). See also Heath P. Tarbert, The Enduring
Legacy of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Derivatives Reforms, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 159, 161-62 (2020)
[hereinafter Tarbert, Enduring Legacy].
149
See, e.g., CCP Supervisory Stress Tests: Reverse Stress Test and Liquidation Stress
Test, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Apr. 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/system/
files/2019/05/01/cftcstresstest042019.pdf.
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interpretations designed to evade regulatory requirements. In sum, the
CFTC’s role as an interpretive authority is necessary to ensure the selfregulatory framework is even-handed and retains integrity.
While these points may seem basic, it is important to recognize that
while self-regulation can advance regulatory goals, there will always
remain areas that require government action. This can be especially true
during a crisis, when quick administrative relief is needed. As discussed in
more detail in Section IV, addressing the coronavirus pandemic (COVID19) required no-action relief from a variety of CFTC regulations. Because
only the CFTC may grant such relief, the agency had a critical role to play
in managing the crisis alongside SROs.
2. International Harmonization
Another area where government action is necessary relates to
international harmonization. While SROs are often adept at formulating
cross-border principles and standards with other SROs,150 the
government—and particularly a federal agency—is critical to advancing
harmonized regulatory systems with foreign governmental counterparts. An
example is the recent harmonization of certain swap data reporting efforts.
In proposing and finalizing a new system for data reporting by swap dealers
and swap data repositories, the CFTC has worked to harmonize its
framework with that of the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA).151 As data is inherently borderless and because swap dealers and
swap data repositories often must report data to both the CFTC and ESMA,
harmonizing reporting requirements where appropriate can produce
significant cost savings and efficiencies for market participants.
For example, the CFTC’s efforts to bring its swap data reporting
system into greater harmony with international coordination efforts has led
to the publication of a CFTC Technical Specification, which contains 128
reportable data fields.152 The Technical Specification streamlines hundreds
of prior fields that were previously required by swap data repositories
operating without clear CFTC guidance. This change will enable the CFTC
to receive the data it needs to perform its regulatory functions while at the
same time reducing duplicative reporting burdens for entities subject to
150
See, e.g., Thomas W. Sexton, III, Nat’l Futures Ass’n President, Keynote Address
before the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, Annual Compliance and Legal
Conference, Oct. 3, 2019 (Paris, France), https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/news
Testimony.asp?ArticleID=5164 (discussing NFA’s role in coordinating international
governance and compliance standards).
151
Domestically, the CFTC has made strides to harmonize its swap data reporting rules
with the SEC’s reporting requirements for security-based swaps.
152
The CFTC’s Part 45 Technical Specification is available at CFTC Technical
Specification: Parts 43 and 45 swap data reporting and public dissemination requirements,
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/media/
4891/DMO_Part43_45TechnicalSpecification091720/download.
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multiple jurisdictions. In proposing revisions to the swap data reporting
rules, the Chairman of the CFTC stated:
As it stands today, a market participant with a swap reportable to the
CFTC might also have to report the same swap to the SEC, the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and perhaps other regulators as
well. The global nature of our derivatives markets has led to the preparation
and submission of multiple swap data reports, creating a byzantine maze of
disparate data fields and reporting timetables. Market participants should
not incur the costs and burdens of reporting a grab-bag of dissimilar data
for the very same swap. That approach helps neither the market nor the
CFTC: conflicting data reporting requirements make regulatory
coordination more difficult, preventing a panoramic view of risk.153
Resolving situations like this requires significant federal action to
coordinate with and align regulatory requirements and technical standards
with foreign regulators.154 While SROs can be very effective at constructing
international standards, they lack the ability to place the imprimatur of the
United States government, as a sovereign nation, on negotiations and
regulatory efforts. In contrast, CFTC action in the swap data reporting
context has given assurances to other regulators that harmonization efforts
have the backing of the United States government. This is important not
only for the mechanics of promulgating rules, but also for international
comity: federal support for collaborative efforts sends a strong signal to
foreign governmental counterparts that can lay the groundwork for future
cooperation.
Signaling aside, there is a practical reason to prefer government action
in the international harmonization space. Just as states and localities do not
negotiate treaties,155 leaving regulatory harmonization efforts primarily to
federal agencies is important to produce a unified and holistic message. The
numerous exchanges in the derivatives space—each an SRO in its own
right—have varying interests and priorities that could complicate efforts to
place them in charge of harmonization efforts with overseas regulators. The
ability of the CFTC to speak with one voice on behalf of the U.S.
derivatives markets when negotiating and collaborating with foreign
regulators is a clear benefit of federal action in the international space.
153
Heath P. Tarbert, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Proposed
Rules on Swap Data Reporting, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tabertstatement022020.
154
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S.
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 712 (2005) (“U.S. federal regulators
have supported international harmonization of regulatory standards, and adopted
international standards domestically . . . .”).
155
See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in the Age of Treaties, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 900 (2004) (“The authority over foreign affairs in general and treaty
making in particular is perhaps the most explicit, detailed, and expansive power that the
Constitution delegates to the federal government.”).
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3. Systemic Risk Mitigation
CFTC action is also necessary to address systemic risk. As mentioned
above, the numerous derivatives exchanges in the United States have
authority over only those persons and entities that trade on a particular
exchange. This can create complications for self-regulation where systemic
risks are involved, as self-regulatory authority is divided among the various
exchanges. In contrast, the CFTC has broad jurisdiction and surveillance
capabilities that extend across the derivatives markets rather than being
confined to particular exchanges. This gives the CFTC a uniquely broad
picture of market-wide risk, coupled with the ability to assert jurisdiction
beyond the confines of a particular exchange or market segment, allowing it
to address systemic threats to the financial system.
The CFTC’s 2020-2024 Strategic Plan expressly includes “[t]aking
steps to avoid systemic risk,” which “will not only protect market
participants, but increase confidence in the soundness of U.S. derivatives
markets.”156 An example is the finalization of the capital rule for swap
dealers and major swap participants, which the CFTC approved in 2020. In
establishing minimum capital requirements, the rule is intended in part to
reduce systemic risk in the financial system by serving as “the ultimate
backstop, ensuring that customers are protected and the financial system
remains sound in the event that all other measures fail.”157
The CFTC as a federal agency also has a unique ability to coordinate
with other federal regulators in the mitigation of systemic risk. One key
example is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was
formed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. FSOC is chaired by the
Secretary of the Treasury and has ten voting members, which include the
heads of federal financial regulators including the CFTC.
The FSOC brings federal regulators together “to constrain excessive
risk in the financial system.”158 Among other things, FSCO facilitates
regulatory cooperation in the systemic risk space through information
sharing, standard setting, and the ability to designate financial market
utilities as systemically important.159
Finally, someone must be responsible for examining the safety and
soundness of the exchanges and clearinghouses themselves. At the time of
this article, there are sixteen exchanges and ten clearinghouses registered
with the CFTC. Two of these clearinghouses—CME and ICE—are
156
CFTC Strategic Plan 2020-2024 at 5, 14, (2020), https://www.cftc.gov/media/3871/
CFTC2020_2024StrategicPlan/download.
157
CFTC, Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of Final Swap Dealer
Capital Rule (July 22, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
tarbertstatement072220.
158
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “About FSOC,” https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/about-fsoc.
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systemically important financial market utilities under Title VIII of the
Dodd-Frank Act. The CFTC exercises its oversight role over clearinghouses
by, among other things, developing and managing a supervision program
that provides for regular examinations and supervisory stress testing.160 As
clearinghouses represent critical financial market infrastructure, the CFTC
is uniquely situated to exercise direct oversight over them.
4. Non-Members of SROs
A final area where CFTC action is necessary is the case of nonmembers of SROs. While SROs have significant self-regulatory authority
over their members, there is relatively little action they can take against
non-members. SROs may not, for example, address fraud committed by bad
actors that are neither SRO members nor trade derivatives on a registered
exchange. In contrast, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement can civilly
prosecute these actors regardless of their registration status or whether they
have used a derivatives exchange in connection with their misconduct.
A recent example includes a series of CFTC enforcement actions161
against commodity trading advisors that failed to become and remain
members of the NFA as required.162 As the former Division of Enforcement
Director remarked, ‘“NFA plays a critical role in the oversight of CFTC
registrants . . . . But NFA can only do its part if registrants submit to its
jurisdictional requirements.”163 Where CFTC registrants fail to submit to
NFA jurisdiction, “the CFTC will act to ensure compliance and to preserve
the NFA’s ability to carry out its important oversight function.”164
This includes fraud and manipulation in the cash markets, which
involve “spot” transactions that are not connected to any exchange. While
the CFTC does not exercise general regulatory authority over spot
commodity transactions, Section 6(c)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act
and Regulation 180.1 give the CFTC the ability to civilly prosecute fraud
and manipulation “in connection with” a commodity in interstate
commerce.165 The CFTC has used this authority to target Bitcoin and digital
asset fraud, the misappropriation of confidential information in connection
with oil markets, leveraged precious metals transactions, and other illicit
activity.166
160

Tarbert, Enduring Legacy, supra note 148, at 160-61.
Press Release, CFTC press rel. no. 8232-20, CFTC Charges 10 Commodity Trading
Advisors for Failing to Maintain NFA Memberships (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/8232-20.
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Commodity trading advisors are required to be members of a registered futures
association pursuant to CFTC Regulation 170.17, 17 C.F.R. § 170.17 (2020).
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Press Release, James M. McDonald, CFTC press rel. no. 8232-20, supra note 161.
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7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2020).
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In sum, while the day-to-day regulation of members of exchanges and
futures associations is committed to SROs, the CFTC retains the ultimate
authority to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations as
to “persons that trade or influence the trading of derivatives contracts,
regardless of their CFTC registration status.”167 The CFTC’s role as a
backstop for all conduct affecting the U.S. derivatives markets
appropriately defers to self-regulation while preventing non-registration
from providing an escape hatch from either regulatory oversight or
accountability for fraud and manipulative conduct.
IV. THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC RESPONSE
Having identified the varying roles the CFTC and SROs play within
U.S. derivatives markets, one should examine how these roles culminated
in a high degree of collaboration that provided stability during one of the
most challenging periods in U.S. economy history: the unprecedent market
volatility wrought by the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). As
demonstrated further below, the key to success in addressing the market
fallout of the pandemic has not been relying solely on either a governmental
or self-regulatory approach, but rather identifying the strengths of each and
deploying them side-by-side in a collaborative way.
And that collaboration was critical to manage a severe economic crisis
that produced historic volatility throughout the derivatives markets. During
March of 2020, nearly every asset was in freefall, including equities,
commodities, and Treasury bills.168 Confidence in the markets was
plummeting, as seen in the soaring prices for credit default swaps—
essentially, insurance on the risk of default.169 Ensuring that the derivatives
markets and those who rely on them were adequately positioned to weather
the storm required the knowledge and experience of both the CFTC and
SROs, each acting in their appropriate capacities.
A. Formal Coordination
One response to the COVID-19 pandemic was the quick formation of
new, formal structures for coordination action between the CFTC and
SROs. In turn, the information gleaned from these structures has been
shared with other regulators by virtue of the CFTC’s role as the primary
regulator for the U.S. derivatives markets. Together, these avenues for
Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In the
Matter of Marcus Schultz, CFTC Docket No. 20-76 (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/media/4871/enfmschultzorder093020/download (misappropriation of
confidential information relating to oil swaps); CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. 966
(9th Cir. 2019) (leveraged precious metals transactions).
167
Mark, supra note 11, at 459.
168
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169
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formal coordination enabled the CFTC and SROs manage the initial fallout
of COVID-19 without missteps.
A primary example was the formation of the Financial Sector
Coronavirus Working Group, led by the Financial Services Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), an industry consortium.170 The
FS-ISAC Coronavirus Working Group has brought together representatives
from the financial services industries, the NFA, and federal regulators such
as the CFTC to share information and market intelligence relating to the
pandemic. Among other things, the Working Group facilitates information
exchange relating to new threats spurred by the pandemic, including fraud
and cybersecurity risks to the financial sector.171
The CFTC’s role at the center of U.S. derivatives markets allowed it to
convey intelligence gathered from coordinated efforts with SROs to other
federal and state regulators, advancing unified responses to market events.
The CFTC’s ability to utilize its own unique data sets—while at the same
time having the benefit of information provided by SROs—promoted a
broader federal response to the pandemic. An example is the CFTC’s
participation in the FSOC and the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets, which were active during the COVID-19 crisis and served as
“essential channels for information sharing and coordinated action.”172
B. Volatility and Systemic Risk Management
Perhaps the most critical financial response to COVID-19 was
managing the historic market volatility of March 2020, which drew from
the expertise of the CFTC, exchanges, clearinghouses, and the NFA.
Systemic risk became a central issue in the coordinated response to the
pandemic because much of the early market volatility, as noted above, was
even more elevated than that of the 2008 financial crisis.173 The central
concern was ensuring that volatility in the markets did not create instability
within the financial system more generally. It is one thing for prices to
swing wildly, but quite another for clearinghouses, exchanges, and firms to
face a liquidity or solvency crisis. While the CFTC as the government
regulator at the helm of the U.S. derivatives markets is ideally situated to
address this kind of systemic risk, it nonetheless relied on assistance and
coordination from SROs in crafting its response to COVID-19-driven
170
For more about FS-ISAC, see FS-ISAC, “Who We Are,” https://www.fsisac.com/
who-we-are.
171
See FS-ISAC website, “Covid-19 Resources,” https://www.fsisac.com/covid19.
172
Statement of CFTC Chairman Heath P. Tarbert Regarding COVID-19 Before the
FSOC Principals Meeting (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches
Testimony/tarbertstatement032620 [hereinafter Tarbert, FSOC Principals].
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See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2. See also Muhammad Suhail Rizwan et al.,
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7334938/ (discussing systemic financial
risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic).
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market events.
The CFTC has performed two primary roles in addressing historic
levels of market volatility and its concomitant potential for systemic risk.
The first builds on existing data-sharing efforts between the CFTC and
SROs, and involves the CFTC’s ability to act as a repository for
information about market status and function. As SROs are closer than the
CFTC to the actual trading of derivatives, they are best able to identify and
share information concerning key market developments. During the
volatility of March 2020, SROs were in regular communication with the
CFTC to ensure that the markets, while subject to seesawing prices, were
nonetheless functioning as expected.174 These communications helped the
CFTC translate real-time market intelligence into nearly twenty discrete
regulatory measures designed to keep the markets operating by giving
market participants the flexibility necessary to continue operations.175
Second, the CFTC acted to mitigate systemic risk by ensuring that
derivatives clearinghouses were functioning as necessary to prevent
financial contagion.176 Importantly, this aspect of the COVID-19 response
is a textbook case study of self-regulation in action. Clearinghouses acted as
the first line of defense, working to ensure that counterparties continued to
post required collateral and margin during the unprecedented volatility of
March 2020.177 The rules requiring margin and collateral to be posted to
clearinghouses were established by the CFTC well before the pandemic.178
Clearinghouses, acting as SROs, acted to fulfill these requirements during a
period of high volatility. Indeed, on the peak day, clearinghouses based in
the United States held over $333 billion in initial margin, marking a record
174
See, e.g., How is the Derivatives Industry Responding to COVID-19, FUTURES
INDUSTRY ASS’N (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.fia.org/articles/how-derivatives-industryresponding-covid-19.
175
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176
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2016),
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further reduce risk.”).
178
See Tarbert, Volatility, supra note 2 (“One important remedy in the CFTC’s medicine
cabinet is a post-2008 requirement that derivatives traders post margin for their swap
positions. Broadly speaking, margin is money or other high-quality collateral that buyers and
sellers exchange to protect against the risk of default. Many derivatives trades—such as
futures and interest-rate swaps—are processed through central clearinghouses, which stand
between the parties and handle the margin process. For derivatives that aren’t centrally
cleared, the CFTC requires transacting parties to exchange margin through third-party
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high.179
The CFTC, for its part, monitored the clearinghouses for compliance
and stability, engaging in near-constant communication with them that went
far beyond the more routine examinations and supervisory efforts outlined
in Section III.A.2, above.180 By monitoring closely the “critical ‘pipes’ at
the clearinghouses through which trades are margined and settled,” the
CFTC was able to help ensure smooth operation and was poised to react
quickly if the system began to break down.181 As in other self-regulatory
models, the clearinghouses as SROs implemented regulatory mandates, but
in turn were subject to oversight be the CFTC as their primary regulator and
supervisor.
Nonetheless, the CFTC’s efforts to monitor for and mitigate systemic
risk during the COVID-19 crisis were substantially aided by SROs. In
particular, exchanges and the NFA were critical in identifying rising
volatility and its impact on market participants. One of the key efforts of
SROs during the period when volatility was unfolding in March 2020 was
to engage their members to initiate business continuity plans. In broad
terms, business continuity plans respond to contingencies that could
undermine the orderly functioning of the derivatives markets, ensuring that
business can continue throughout periods of dislocation.182 The NFA, for
example, contacted all of its futures commission merchant and swap dealer
members, as well as a large population of its remaining membership, to
ensure that their business continuity plans were up-to-date and could
effectively address market volatility arising from the COVID-19
pandemic.183
The NFA also worked with members on contingency planning even
before the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention formally declared
that COVID-19 was a pandemic to “ensure that their [business continuity]
plans” accounted for pandemic-driven dislocations, including ensuring that
communication systems with key entities such as a derivatives clearing
organizations were robust, and advising members to prepare for the
possibility that COVID-19 could “materially impact their businesses.”184
These and other efforts helped mitigate systemic risk by enabling NFA
members to weather the ensuing market volatility.
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C. Governmental Regulatory Relief
While SROs worked with their members to help ensure smooth trading
and operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the statutory framework
governing the U.S. derivatives markets created areas where CFTC
regulatory relief was necessary. That relief reflected collaboration with
SROs, which helped identify areas of concern and proposed solutions
necessary to navigate the market effects of the pandemic. In many
instances, SROs marshalled feedback from their members and conveyed
those views to the CFTC, which responded with temporary no-action relief
from relevant regulations. This relief provided market participants with the
flexibility to continue trading activities in a seamless manner despite
historic levels of volatility combined with changes in how the nation’s
workforce operated.
A key example of SRO-CFTC collaboration in fashioning temporary
no-action relief during the COVID-19 pandemic has been various measures
designed to accommodate social distancing. It became clear early on during
the COVID-19 crisis that “[s]ocial distancing . . . created novel hurdles to
complying with regulatory requirements that were written with traditional
centralized offices in mind.”185 Recognizing this issue, exchanges contacted
the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight and “indicated that . . . market
participants may be unable to comply with . . . self-regulatory requirements
imposed under exchange rules,” including voice recording, location-based
trading, and electronic timestamp requirements.186 The exchanges also
expressed concern about their ability to comply with related CFTC
regulations concerning audit-trail and market-monitoring requirements.187
In granting temporary no-action relief from these regulatory
requirements, the CFTC made clear that exchanges were expected “to
remain particularly vigilant in their self-regulatory functions and to
implement compensating controls” in order to guard against market
participants who might “take advantage of market volatility to engage in
improper trading.”188 The CFTC also stipulated that exchanges had to
“continue to conduct customer business in accordance with . . . exchange
rules,” and required that exchange rules not affected by social distancing
efforts would “continue to apply” to trading during the period of no-action
relief.189
The comprehensive and diverse nature of CFTC no-action relief
provides a significant window into the collaborative nature of the CFTCSRO relationship in times of crisis. First, relying on their on-the-ground
185
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position with respect to market participants and the dynamics of
implementing COVID-19 response measures such as social distancing, the
exchanges were quickly able to identify areas where pandemic responses
would create tension with regulatory requirements. Second, the CFTC—in
granting no-action relief from certain regulatory requirements—relied on
exchanges to “implement compensating controls” to ensure fair trading.
This is an important example of principles-based regulation190 in the SRO
space: the CFTC issued a broad instruction based on the principle that
derivatives trading should be free of misconduct. Exchanges, acting as
SROs, were left to determine the most effective means of producing that
result during a period of market volatility. Furthermore, in granting noaction relief, the CFTC relied on exchanges to continue to enforce their
own rules, thus trusting the SRO structure to safeguard trading during a
period in which relief from certain regulatory controls was needed.
Finally, the pandemic demonstrated that certain regulatory measures
must fall squarely within the CFTC’s purview, showing the enduring need
for federal action alongside self-regulation. In particular, COVID-19
created implementation concerns regarding the ability of some market
participants to comply with the CFTC’s margin rules for uncleared
swaps.191 These transactions are generally conducted bilaterally, outside the
exchanges and not managed by a clearinghouse. They are therefore outside
traditional SROs and parties to these trades are not necessarily NFA
members. The CFTC responded by issuing an interim final rule that
extended the margin compliance deadline by one year.192 Unlike the noaction relief described above, here the CFTC issued an interim final rule
that had the effect of modifying a prior rule that established an earlier
compliance deadline for the CFTC’s margin rules.193 As the margin rules
are established by CFTC regulations, only CFTC action could provide this
relief, underscoring the need for a federal role within a system that greatly
benefits from the dynamism of SROs.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. derivatives markets are evolving rapidly, fueled by
digitalization trends that are creating new asset types and bringing new
participants into the markets. One constant has remained amidst this
change: a strong self-regulatory tradition that relies on a combination of
governmental and private efforts. The collaborative response to COVID-19
190
For a fulsome discussion of principles versus rules-based regulation, see Tarbert,
Principles, supra note 83.
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192
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is only the most recent example of self-regulation at work in the U.S.
derivatives markets. While the framework described in this article may
evolve with the markets, its basic tenets of CFTC oversight coupled with
self-regulation by exchanges, clearinghouses, and the NFA are time-tested
and robust, while simultaneously flexible enough to address innovation and
change. In sum, self-regulation in U.S. derivatives markets continues to
provide stability through collaboration.
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